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Abstract:  
We analyze welfare maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic two-country model with price 
stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality 
affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing 
literature, we remain consistent to a public finance approach by an explicit consideration of all 
the distortions that are relevant to the Ramsey planner. This strategy entails two main 
advantages. First, it allows an accurate characterization of optimal policy in an economy that 
evolves around a steady-state which is not necessarily efficient. Second, it allows to describe 
a full range of alternative dynamic equilibria when price setters in both countries are 
completely forward-looking and households’ preferences are not restricted. In this context, we 
study optimal policy both in the long-run and along a dynamic path, and we compare optimal 
commitment policy under Nash competition and under cooperation. By deriving a second 
order accurate solution to the policy functions, we also characterize the welfare gains from 
international policy cooperation. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the classic approach to the study of optimal policy in dynamic economies (Ramsey (1927),
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1992)), and
in a typical public ﬁnance spirit, a Ramsey planner maximizes household’s welfare subject to a
resource constraint, to the constraints describing the equilibrium in the private sector economy,
and via an explicit consideration of all the distortions that characterize both the long-run and the
cyclical behavior of the economy.
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest for a Ramsey-type approach in dynamic
general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities. Khan, King and Wolman (2003) analyze optimal
monetary policy in a closed economy where the relevant distortions are imperfect competition,
staggered price setting and monetary transaction frictions. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), and
Siu (2003) focus on the joint optimal determination of monetary and ﬁscal policy. The robust
conclusion of these studies - that optimal policy is associated to the prescription of stable inﬂation
- is indeed rooted in the principle that the planner tries to eliminate the distortions induced by
ﬂuctuations in the aggregate price level, whether stemming from relative price misalignments or
from resource costs of resetting prices.
In this paper we characterize welfare maximizing monetary policy in a two-country world
where ﬁnancial markets are complete, policymakers act under commitment and compete in a Nash
equilibrium. Both economies are characterized by two distortions: output is ineﬃciently low (due to
the presence of monopolistic competitive goods markets) and ﬁrms face quadratic costs of adjusting
prices. However, and relative to a cooperative setting enforced by a world Ramsey planner, openness
per se adds a further ineﬃciency typical of the outcome under a Nash equilibrium. This ineﬃciency
stems from the monopoly power that each country can exert on its own terms of trade, and therefore
from an externality that the policy competition motive necessarily entails.1
Relative to the corresponding closed economy literature, a Ramsey-type approach has received
much less attention in the analysis of optimal monetary and exchange rate arrangements for open
economies. Cooley and Quadrini (2003) analyze monetary policy interaction in a model with
perfectly competitive goods markets, ﬂexible prices and limited ﬁnancial markets participation.
Their model is essentially static in nature and highlights the presence of a systematic inﬂation
bias induced by international policy competition. Our framework diﬀe r sf r o mt h e i r si nt h ef a c t
that prices are sticky (so that nominal exchange rate movements exert an eﬀect on international
1T h ei d e at h a tt e r m so ft r a d es p i l l o v e r sg e n e r a t ea ne x t e r nality and therefore room for international (monetary
and/or ﬁscal) policy coordination is already discussed (although within ad-hoc models) in Canzoneri and Henderson
(1991), Persson and Tabellini (1995) and dates back in the trade literature at least to Johnson (1954). Chari
and Kehoe (1990) discuss the speciﬁc role of terms of trade distortions for optimal ﬁscal policy in a two-country
general equilibrium model. More recently, see Corsetti and Pesenti (2000), Tille (2001), Benigno and Benigno (2003),
Sutherland (2002).
2relative prices), goods markets are imperfectly competitive and agents operate in a fully dynamic
environment.
A Ramsey-type approach has also been employed in a certain stream of the so-called New
Open Economy Macroeconomics literature (which instead typically features nominal rigidities and
imperfect competition). This is the case - for instance - in the work of Benigno and Benigno
(2003b), Corsetti and Pesenti (2002), and Devereux and Engel (2003). However, although elegant,
these are stylized frameworks in which the analysis of optimal policy is simpliﬁed by the assumption
that prices (or wages) are predetermined one-period. Such an assumption is restrictive, for it
typically generates a Lucas-type aggregate supply curve in which the forward-looking nature of
inﬂation is neglected, and along with it the channel through which the anticipation of future policy
conduct comes to play a role.2 Our work diﬀers from the aforementioned contributions in that it
employs optimizing producers’ price setting decisions that are forward-looking, thereby rendering
the corresponding optimal policy problem inherently dynamic.
Our analysis can be summarized in terms of three main contributions. First, we show that
policy competition in an international setting leads welfare maximizing but independent policymak-
ers to generally deviate from the prescription of price stability. Intuitively, in an open economy,
the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution (between consumption and leisure) and the
marginal rate of transformation depends not only on the fact that markups are time-varying (due
to monopolistic competition coupled with sticky prices), but also on the dynamic behavior of the
terms of trade. Hence each country tries to engineer price level movements to try to tilt relative
prices in its own favour. On the other hand, when policy is set in a centralized fashion by a world
Ramsey planner, the two countries manage to coordinate their actions in such a way to repli-
cate very closely the equilibrium dynamics that would prevail under purely ﬂexible prices (thereby
mimicking closely the outcome of a corresponding closed economy).
Second, and more generally, our approach allows to study optimal policy in dynamic economies
that evolve around a steady-state which is not necessarily eﬃcient. In that, it diﬀers crucially from
a recurrent approach in the recent New-Keynesian literature that forces another (complementary)
policy instrument (e.g., ﬁscal subsidies) to oﬀset second order eﬀects of stochastic uncertainty on
the mean levels of variables.3 The same approach resorts to a two-step strategy that involves,
at ﬁrst, taking a log-linear approximation of the competitive equilibrium conditions, and then a
quadratic approximation of the correct households’ utility function. In particular, resorting to such
an approximation method in an open economy requires speciﬁc assumptions on preferences, such as
log-utility and unitary elasticity of substitution between goods produced in diﬀerent countries. Yet
2It is by now well understood that this entails a major consequence in that it neglects the sense in which (time
consistent) discretionary policies are suboptimal in dynamic environments with forward-looking price (and/or wage)
decisions (Woodford, 2003).
3See, for instance, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2002).
3precisely these assumptions already constrain the form of the optimal policy to coincide, somewhat
artiﬁcially, with the one that implements the ﬂexible price allocation. Furthermore, if not satisﬁed,
the same conditions do not allow to study each country’s policymaker’s problem independently,
forcing to ignore those equilibria that emerge under policy competition and to restrict the analysis
only to the world planner’s policy design problem.4
Third, we argue that, in this framework, welfare gains from cooperation, although positive,
are small. To reach this conclusion, once the eﬃciency conditions of the corresponding optimal
policy problem have been characterized, we resort to second order approximation methods (in
the neighborhood of the speciﬁed Ramsey steady-state).5 This is required to account for the
fact that when business cycle ﬂuctuations are centered around a distorted steady state stochastic
volatility aﬀects the ﬁrst moments of those variables that may be critical for the household’s welfare
evaluation.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 describe respectively
the economic environment and the features of the equilibrium. Section 4 derives the form of the
constraints that are relevant to the planner’s policy problem. Section 5 analyzes optimal policy
under commitment. Section 6 explores the welfare gains from cooperation. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of two countries, that we label them Home and Foreign. Each economy
is populated by inﬁnite-lived agents, whose total measure is normalized to unity.
2.1 Domestic Households
Let’s denote by Ct ≡ [(1−α)
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t +α
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t ]
η−1
η a composite consumption index of domestic and
imported bundles of goods, where α is the balanced-trade steady state share of imported goods
(i.e., an inverse measure of home bias in consumption preferences), and η>0 is the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Each bundle is composed of imperfectly
substitutable varieties (with elasticity of substitution ε>1). Optimal allocation of expenditure
4More recently, Benigno and Woodford (2003) show (within a closed economy model) how to preserve a quadratic
approximation of the household’s welfare objective in the case in which the economy ﬂuctuates around a non-eﬃcient
steady-state. This per se requires taking a second order approximation also of (some of) the underlying equilibrium
conditions. Benigno and Benigno (2003a) and Pappa (2003) apply this approximation method to a two-country
optimal policy dynamic model.
5Incidentally, one may want to notice that this entails a strategy which exactly reverses the logic of the approxi-
mation method described above, and largely employed in the recent literature.
6For the development and the application of second order approximation methods for welfare evaluation see Bergin
and Tchakarov (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), Kolmann (2002), Kim and Kim (2002), Sims (2001).
4within each variety of goods yields:
CH,t(i)=
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t
¶−ε
CH,t ; CF,t(i)=
µ
PF,t(i)
PF,t
¶−ε
CF,t (1)
where CH,t ≡
R 1
0 [CH,t(i)
 −1
  di]
 
 −1 and CF,t ≡
R 1
0 [CF,t(i)
 −1
  di]
 
 −1.
Optimal allocation of expenditure between domestic and foreign bundles yields:
CH,t =( 1− α)
µ
PH,t
Pt
¶−η
Ct; CF,t = α
µ
PF,t
Pt
¶−η
Ct (2)
where Pt ≡ [(1 − α)P
1−η
H,t + αP
1−η
F,t ]
1
1−η is the CPI index.
We assume the existence of complete markets for state-contingent money claims expressed in
units of domestic currency.7 Let st = {s0,....st} denote the history of events up to date t,w h e r est
is the event realization at date t. The date 0 probability of observing history st is given by ρ(st).
The initial state s0 is given so that ρ(s0) = 1. Agents maximize the following expected discounted
sum of utilities over possible paths of consumption and labor:
E0
(
∞ X
t=0
βtU (Ct,N t)
)
(3)
where where E0 {} denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditioned on s0,a n dNt
denotes labor hours.8 We assume that period utility is separable in its arguments. At the beginning
of time t the households receive a nominal labor income of WtNt. To insure their consumption
pattern against random shocks at time t they decide to spend νt+1,tBt+1 in nominal state contingent
securities where νt,t+1 ≡ ν(st+1|st) is the pricing kernel of the state contingent portfolio. Each state
contingent asset Bt+1 pays one unit of domestic currency at time t +1a n di ns t a t est+1.H e n c e
the sequence of budget constraints, after considering the optimal expenditure conditions (1) and
(2), assumes the following form:
PtCt +
X
st+1
νt+1,tBt+1 ≤ WtNt + τt + Bt +
Z 1
0
Γt(i)( 4 )
7Given that, in our setting, the law of one price holds continually, the unit of denomination of the payoﬀso f
state-contingent assets is not strictly relevant. Alternatively, e.g., in the case in which deviations from the law of one
price are due to consumer currency pricing, as in Devereux and Engel (2003), the distinction between nominal and
real payoﬀsw o u l db er e l e v a n tf o rt h es p e c i ﬁcation of the equilibrium.
8Hence the expression for lifetime utility is equivalent to writing
∞ X
t=0
X
st
β
tU
¡
C(s
t)
¢
ρ(s
t)
where ρ(s
t)=ρ(st|s0).
5where τt are government net transfers of domestic currency and Γt(i)a r et h ep r o ﬁts of monopolistic
ﬁrm i, whose shares are owned by the domestic residents.9 Households choose the set of processes
{Ct,N t}∞
t=0 and bonds {Bt+1}∞
t=0, taking as given the set of processes {Pt,W t,v t+1,t}∞
t=0 and the
initial wealth B0 so as to maximize (3) subject to (4).
For any given state of the world, the following set of eﬃciency conditions must hold:
Uc,t
Wt
Pt
= −Un,t (5)
β
Pt
Pt+1
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
= νt+1,t (6)
lim
j→∞
Et {νt+j,tBt+j} =0 ( 7 )
where U ,t deﬁnes the ﬁrst order derivative of utility with respect to its argument κ = C,N.O u r
separability assumption implies Ucn,t = Unc,t = 0. Equation (5) equates the CPI-based real wage
to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Optimality requires that the
ﬁrst order conditions (5), (6) and the no-Ponzi game condition (7) are simultaneously satisﬁed.10
The conditional expected return on the state contingent asset is given by Rn,t,s ot h a t ,b y
arbitrage, it holds
R−1
n,t ≡ Et {νt+1,t}
2.2 Law of One Price and Foreign Demand
We assume throughout that the law of one price holds, implying that PF(i)=E P∗
F(i) for all
i ∈ [0,1], where E is the nominal exchange rate, i.e., the price of foreign currency in terms of home
currency, and P∗
F(i) is the price of foreign good i denominated in foreign currency. Let’s denote by
BF foreign households’ holdings of the state contingent bond denominated in domestic currency.
The budget constraint of the foreign representative household will read:
P∗
t C∗
t +
X
st+1
νt+1,t
BF
t+1
Et
≤ W∗
t N∗
t + τ∗
t +
BF
t
Et
+
Z 1
0
Γ∗
t(i)( 8 )
The eﬃciency condition for bonds’ holdings is
β
P∗
t Et
P∗
t+1Et+1
U∗
c∗,t+1
U∗
c∗,t
= νt+1,t (9)
9Each domestic household owns an equal share of the domestic monopolistic ﬁrms.
10Notice that we do not introduce money explicitly, but rather think of it as playing the role of nominal unit
of account. For the sake of simplicity, this allows us to abstract from an additional distortion stemming from the
presence of transactions frictions. See Khan, King and Wolman (2003) for an analysis in which transactions frictions
interact with monopolistic competition and price staggering in a welfare maximizing monetary policy problem.
6F o r e i g nd e m a n df o rd o m e s t i cv a r i e t yi must satisfy:
C∗
H,t(i)=
Ã
P∗
H,t(i)
P∗
H,t
!−ε
C∗
H,t (10)
=
Ã
P∗
H,t(i)
P∗
H,t
!−ε
α∗
µP∗
H,t
P∗
t
¶−η
C∗
t
The remaining eﬃciency conditions characterizing the foreign economy are then exactly sym-
metric to the ones of the domestic economy described above.
2.3 Domestic Producers
Each monopolistic ﬁrm i produces a homogenous good according to:
Yt(i)=At Nt(i) (11)
The cost minimizing choice of labor input implies:
Wt
PH,t
= mctAt (12)
where mc denotes the real marginal cost. Changing output prices is subject to some costs. We
follow Rotemberg (1982) and model the cost of adjusting prices for each ﬁrm i equal to:
ψt(i) ≡
θ
2
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t
− 1
¶2
(13)
where the parameter θ measures the degree of price stickiness. The higher the θ the more sluggish
is the adjustment of nominal prices. If θ =0p r i c e sa r eﬂexible. The cost of price adjustment
renders the domestic producer’s pricing problem dynamic. Each producer chooses the price PH,t(i)
of variety i to maximize its total market value:
Et
(
∞ X
t=0
βtλt
Dt(i)
PH,t
)
(14)
subject to the constraint
Yt(i) ≤
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t
¶−ε
(CH,t + C∗
H,t) (15)
where βtλt measures the marginal utility value to the representative producer of additional proﬁts
expressed in domestic currency, and where
7Dt(i)
PH,t
≡
PH,t(i)Yt(i)
PH,t
−
Wt
PH,t
Nt −
θ
2
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t−1(i)
− 1
¶2
The ﬁrst order condition of the above problem reads
0=λt
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t
¶−  CW
t
PH,t
Ã
(1 − ε)+ε
Wt
AtPH,t
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t
¶−1!
(16)
−λtθ
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t−1(i)
− 1
¶
1
PH,t−1(i)
+ βλt+1θ
µ
PH,t+1(i)
PH,t(i)
− 1
¶
PH,t+1(i)
PH,t(i)2
Let’s deﬁne e pH,t ≡
PH,t(i)
PH,t as the relative price of domestic variety i and πH,t ≡
PH,t
PH,t−1 as the gross
domestic producer inﬂation rate. It is useful to see that the above condition can be rewritten as
0=λtCW
t e pH,t
−ε
µ
(1 − ε)+ε
Wt
AtPH,t
¶
− (17)
λtθ
µ
πHt,1
e pH,t
e pH,t−1
− 1
¶
πH,t
e pH,t−1
+ βλt+1θ
µ
πH,t+1
e pH,t+1
e pH.t
− 1
¶
πH,t+1
e pH,t+1
e pH,t2
3 Equilibrium in the Home Economy
We focus our attention on a symmetric equilibrium where all domestic producers charge the same
price, adopt the same technology and therefore choose the same demand for labor. This implies
that e pH,t =1 ,Nt(i)=Nt, Γt(i)=Γt for all i, t.
In such an equilibrium equation (17) will simplify to
λtπH,t(πH,t − 1) = βEt {λt+1πH,t+1(πH,t+1 − 1)} +
λtεAtNt
θ
µ
mct −
ε − 1
ε
¶
(18)
The total net supply of bonds must satisfy
Bt + BF
t =0
Market clearing for domestic variety i must satisfy:
Yt(i)=CH,t(i)+C∗
H,t(i)+ψt(i) (19)
=
µ
PH,t(i)
PH,t
¶−ε "µ
PH,t
Pt
¶−η
(1 − α)Ct +
µP∗
H,t
P∗
t
¶−η
α∗C∗
t
#
+ ψt(i)
8for all i ∈ [0,1] and t. Plugging (19) into the deﬁnition of aggregate output Yt ≡
hR 1
0 Y (i)1−1
ε di
i ε
ε−1,
and recalling that PH,t = EtP∗
H,t, we can express the resource constraint as
AtNt =
µ
PH,t
Pt
¶−η
(1 − α) Ct +
µ
PH,t
EtP∗
t
¶−η
α∗C∗
t + ψt (20)
4 Deriving the Relevant Constraints
As mentioned before, the optimal policy is determined by a monetary authority that maximizes
the discounted sum of utilities of all agents given the constraints that characterize the competitive
economy. Our next task is to select the relations that represent the relevant constraints in the
planner’s optimal policy problem. This amounts to describing the competitive equilibrium in terms
of a minimal set of relations involving only real allocations, in the spirit of the primal approach
described in Lucas and Stokey (1983). There is a diﬀerence, though, between that classic approach
and the one followed here, which stems from the impossibility, in the presence of sticky prices,
of reducing the planner’s problem to a maximization only subject to a single implementability
constraint. Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) face a similar
problem in their analysis of dynamic optimal policy problems in the presence of price stickiness.
4.1 Resource and Budget Constraints
Let’s begin by analyzing the domestic goods market equilibrium condition (20). This can be
rewritten as
AtNt =( 1 − α) CtΦ
η
t + Q
η
tΦ
η
tα∗C∗
t + ψt (21)
= Φ
η
t
µ
(1 − α) Ct +
µ
κU∗
c∗,t
Uc,t
¶η
α∗C∗
t +
θ
2
(πH,t − 1)
2
¶
Symmetrically, the resource constraint in the Foreign country will read:
A∗
tN∗
t =( Φ∗
t)
η
Ã
(1 − α∗) C∗
t +
Ã
Uc,t
κU∗
c∗,t
!η
αCt +
θ
2
¡
π∗
F,t − 1
¢2
!
(22)
Next we turn to the budget constraint of the Home consumers. By substituting the government
budget constraint (which implies τt =0f o ra l lt) into equation (4), imposing (7) and iterating, one
obtains (in units of domestic currency):
B0 +
∞ X
t=0
X
st
z0,t [WtNt + Γt]=
∞ X
t=0
X
st
z0,tPtCt (23)
9where the price system z0,t is obtained after iteration of equation (6) and can be expressed as (for
each possible state st)
z0,t = βtρt
Uc,t
Pt
P0
Uc,0
(24)
Notice, next, that aggregate real proﬁts can be written as:
Γt
Pt
=
(1 − mct)AtNt − θ
2(πH,t − 1)2
Φt
(25)
where Φt ≡ Pt
PH,t is the CPI to PPI ratio
By summing over all possible states st in equation (24), substituting (25), (5) and (44) into
(23), we obtain the present value budget constraint for domestic households (expressed in real
terms):
e B0 + E0
∞ X
t=0
βtUc,t
"
AtNt − θ
2(πH,t − 1)2
Φt
#
= E0
∞ X
t=0
βtUc,tCt (26)
where e B0 ≡ B0
P0 Uc,0. This equation states that the sum of initial ﬁnancial wealth and expected
present discounted net income must match the expected presented discounted value of consumption.
We proceed in a similar fashion for the Foreign household. The price system zF
0,t = ν1,0ν2,1..νt,t−1,
with ν0 = 1, expressed in units of domestic currency and obtained from the forward iteration of
(9) can be written:
zF
0,t =
Ã
βtρt
U∗
c∗,t
P∗
t
P∗
0
U∗
c∗,0
!
E0
Et
≡ z∗
0,t
E0
Et
= z0,t (27)
Equating with (24) implies the following condition
κ
U∗
c∗,t
Uc,t
=
EtP∗
t
Pt
≡ Qt (28)
where Qt i st h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea n dκ ≡
E0P∗
0 Uc,0
P0U∗
c∗,0
is a parameter capturing the initial cross-
country distribution of wealth.11 Below we discuss how this parameter signals the underlying
risk-sharing arrangement between the two countries.
By taking conditional expectations of both sides of (27) and proceeding with similar substitu-
tions to the ones operated in the Home case we obtain12
11See also Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2003).
12In particular one should note that
e B
∗
0 =
B
F
0
E0
Uc,0 κ
−1
P0
Since equilibrium requires B
F
0 = −B0 we obtain e B
∗
0 = − e B0κ
−1.
10− e B0κ−1 + E0
∞ X
t=0
βtU∗
c∗,t
"
A∗
tN∗
t − θ
2(π∗
F,t − 1)2
Φ∗
t
#
= E0
∞ X
t=0
βtU∗
c∗,tC∗
t (29)
4.2 Risk-sharing and PPP
Consider the domestic household maximizing (3) subject to (26). Eﬃciency requires
βtUc,t = Ω z0,tPt (30)
where Ω is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (26). Notice that this mutiplier is constant across
time and states. Symmetrically, for the Foreign household we have:
βtU∗
c,t = Ω∗ z∗
0,tP∗
t (31)
= Ω∗
Ã
zF
0,t
E0
!
EtP∗
t
By combining (30), (31) and (28), and applying the normalization E0 = 1, one can write the
risk-sharing parameter in terms of relative shadow values of net income:
κ =
Ω
Ω∗ (32)
This allows the following deﬁnition of risk sharing:
Deﬁnition 1. Complete international asset markets lead to perfect risk-sharing when the
shadow value of the household’s present value budget constraint is equalized across countries. From
(32), this in turn requires that κ =1 .
The risk sharing arrangement has implications on how the marginal utilities of consumption
are linked across countries. By combining (26) with (21) and (28), and assuming (for the pure sake
of simplicity) that the initial level of wealth is zero (so that B0 = B∗
0 =0 )o n ec a nw r i t e
∞ X
t=0
X
st
βtUc,t
Ω
½
Φ
η−1
t
µ
(1 − α)Ct +
µ
κ
U∗
c,t
Uc,t
¶η
α∗C∗
t
¶
− Ct
¾
=0
and similarly for Foreign
∞ X
t=0
X
st
βtU∗
c,t
Ω∗
(
(Φ∗
t)
η−1
Ã
(1 − α∗)C∗
t +
µ
κ
U∗
c,t
Uc,t
¶−η
αCt
!
− C∗
t
)
=0
11Next we assume cross-country symmetry,s ot h a tα = α∗. It is important to notice that this does
not necessarily imply that PPP holds, unless we make the further restrictive assumption of absence
of home bias, which entails α = α∗ = 1
2.13
Using (32) one can solve for κ, obtaining:
κ =
P∞
t=0
P
st βtUc,t
n
Φ
η−1
t Zt − Ct
o
P∞
t=0
P
st βtU∗
c,t
n
(Φ∗
t)
η−1 Z∗
t − C∗
t
o (33)
where Zt ≡
³
(1 − α)Ct +
³
κ
U∗
c,t
Uc,t
´η
αC∗
t
´
and Z∗
t ≡
µ
(1 − α)C∗
t +
³
κ
U∗
c,t
Uc,t
´−η
αCt
¶
.
Hence κ = 1 (perfect risk-sharing) requires
∞ X
t=0
X
st
βtUc,t
n
Φ
η−1
t Zt − Ct
o
=
∞ X
t=0
X
st
βtU∗
c,t
n
(Φ∗
t)
η−1 Z∗
t − C∗
t
o
(34)
Notice that the last expression does not necessarily imply a perfect equalization of the marginal
utilities of consumption. The latter property follows only in the particular case of absence of home
bias, which in turn implies that PPP holds. In this case, and recalling (28), condition κ =1r e q u i r e s
Uc,t = U∗
c,t, and therefore Ct = C∗
t . It is then easy to verify that (34) also implies Φt = Φ∗
t for all t.
4.3 Relative Prices and Price Setting Constraints
Below we deﬁne a series of relationships linking real quantities to the relevant relative prices in our
framework. The terms of trade is the relative price of imported goods:
Tt ≡
PF,t
PH,t
(35)
It can be related to the CPI-PPI ratio as follows
Φt ≡
Pt
PH,t
=[ ( 1− α)+αT
1−η
t ]
1
1−η ≡ g(Tt) (36)
with g
0
> 0. The terms of trade and the real exchange rate are linked through the following
expression:
Tt =
PF,t Φt
Pt
(37)
= Qt
Φt
Φ∗
t
13One can easily verify this by manipulating the CPI expression and substituting conditions PH,t = EtP
∗
H,t and
PF,t = EtP
∗
F,t, which are implied by the fact that the law of one price holds.
12where
Φ∗
t ≡
P∗
t
P∗
F,t
=[ ( 1− α∗)+α∗T
η−1
t ]
1
1−η ≡ g∗(Tt) (38)
with g∗0
< 0.
We now wish to rewrite the relative prices Φt and Φ∗
t as a function or real allocations only.
By combining (36), (37), (38) and (28), and recalling that α∗one can write
Φt =



(1 − α∗) − α
³
κ
U∗
c,t
Uc,t
´1−η
1 − (α + α∗)


 ≡ h(Ct,C∗
t ) (39)
and symmetrically
Φ∗
t =



(1 − α) − α∗
³
κ
U∗
c,t
Uc,t
´η−1
1 − (α + α∗)


 ≡ h∗(Ct,C∗
t ) (40)
Notice that when η = 1, (39) reduces to Φt = Φ∗
t =1f o ra l lt. In this particular case which
corresponds to Cobb-Douglas consumption preferences, the policy competition motive on the terms
of trade vanishes.
The CPI level can be linked to the domestic price level and aggregate consumption as follows:
Pt = PH,t Φt. Let’s then deﬁne gross CPI inﬂation as πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1. This is related to domestic
producer inﬂation and aggregate relative consumption as follows:
πt = πH,t
Φt
Φt−1
(41)
The condition on optimal bond investment can then be rearranged accordingly. By taking condi-
tional expectations of (6) we obtain
Uc,t = βEt {RtUc,t+1} (42)
where
Rt = Et
½
Rn
t Pt
Pt+1
¾
(43)
is the CPI-based gross real interest rate.
Next we need to rearrange the optimality conditions for the production sector. This requires,
at ﬁrst, to express the real marginal cost and the real wage in terms of aggregate real quantities.
Hence by combining (5) and (12) we can write
13mct = −
Un,t
Uc,tAt
Φt (44)
This implies that the aggregate condition for optimal pricing (18) can be rewritten as
Uc,tπH,t(πH,t − 1) = βUc,t+1Et {πH,t+1(πH,t+1 − 1)} + (45)
Uc,tεAtNt
θ
µ
−
Un,t
Uc,tAt
Φt −
ε − 1
ε
¶
An analogous condition will hold in Foreign:
U∗
c∗,tπ∗
F,t(π∗
F,t − 1) = βU∗
c∗,tEt
©
π∗
F,t+1(π∗
F,t+1 − 1)
ª
+ (46)
U∗
c∗,tεA∗
tN∗
t
θ
Ã
−
U∗
n,t
U∗
c∗,tA∗
t
Φ∗
t −
ε − 1
ε
!
In the following, we formulate a proposition that establishes a mapping between the minimal
form expressed above (summarized by conditions (21), (26), (45), for Home, and (22), (29), (46)
for Foreign) and the set of allocations describing the (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium in the
world economy.
Proposition 1. (Part A) For a given initial symmetric wealth level e B0, any equilibrium
allocation {Ct, Yt, Nt, mct, Qt, Φt,π H,t,C F,t,C H,t}∞
t=0 satisfying equations (2),( 4 ) ,(5)-(7), (12),
(18), (20), the risk-sharing condition (28), along with a symmetric set of conditions holding for
Foreign, also satisﬁes equations (21), (26), (45), (22), (29) and (46). (Part B) By reverse, using
allocations {Ct, Nt, πH,t}∞
t=0 and {C∗
t , N∗
t , π∗
F,t}∞
t=0 that satisfy equations (45), (21), (26) and
(46), (22), (29), it is possible to construct all the remaining real allocations, nominal variables and
policy instruments for Home and Foreign.
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment
We now turn to the speciﬁcation of the optimal policy problem in a dynamic context. We assume
that ex-ante commitment is feasible. In this section we take full advantage of our characterization
of the equilibrium conditions (in each country) in terms of a minimal set of relations involving only
the choice of allocations for consumption and labor input along with the inﬂation instrument.
A distinctive feature of our Ramsey analysis is that we allow the relevant distortions charac-
terizing the economy to remain explicit, both in the short and in the long-run.14 This implies that
14See King and Wolman (1999) for a closed economy analog.
14the policymaker in each country lacks a set of ﬁscal instruments necessary to achieve the ﬁrst best
allocation. Each economy is in fact characterized by three distortions. The ﬁr s tt w o ,m a r k e tp o w e r
and price stickiness, are common to both the closed and the open economy version of our model.
The price stickiness distortion, summarized by the quadratic term in inﬂation in the resource con-
straint, is obviously minimized at zero net inﬂation (i.e., πH,t =1f o ra l lt). On the other hand,
the market power distortion, stemming from the level of activity being ineﬃciently low, calls for
the monetary authority to try to expand output and consumption.
What in general distinguishes the analysis of an open economy (and as also emphasized in
Corsetti and Pesenti (2000)), is the presence of an additional ineﬃciency. This stems from the
possibility for each country, in the presence of rigid nominal prices, of strategically aﬀecting the
terms of trade, and in turn try to increase its level of consumption for any given level of labor eﬀort.
This externality creates per se room for policy competition, and for the possibility of gains from
cooperative policies. The interesting aspect concerns the extent to which such policy competition
motive may lead each policymaker to try to deviate from the prescription of price stability that
would typically characterize optimal policy in the closed economy version of our model.
5.1 Nash Competition
We begin by assuming that the policymaker in each country sets policy independently taking as
given policy actions in the other country.
Deﬁnition 2.L e t ’ sd e ﬁne U(Ct,N t,π H,t, Ω) ≡ U(Ct,N t)+Ω
·
Uc,t
µ
Ct −
AtNt−θ
2(πH,t−1)2
Φt
¶¸
where Ω is the multiplier on constraint (26). Let {λp,t,λ f,t}
∞
t=0 represent sequences of Lagrange
multipliers on the constraints (45) and (21) respectively. Let e B0 be given. Then for given allocations
{C∗
t }∞
t=0 and stochastic processes {At, A∗
t}∞
t=0, plans for the control variables {Ct,π H,t,N t}∞
t=0,
and for the costate variables {λp,t,λ f,t}∞
t=0 and Ω, represent a ﬁrst best constrained allocation if
they solve the following maximization problem:
Choose Λn
t ≡ {λp,t,λ f,t}∞
t=0 and Ξn
t ≡ {Ct,π H,t,N t}∞
t=0 to
Min{Λn
t }∞
t=0 Max{Ξn
t }∞
t=0 E0{
∞ X
t=0
βtEt{U(Ct,N t,πH,t,Ω) (47)
+λp,t
·
Uc,tπH,t(πH,t − 1) − βUc,t+1πH,t+1(πH,t+1 − 1) +
Uc,tεAtNt
θ
µ
Un,t Φt
Uc,tAt
+
ε − 1
ε
¶¸
+λf,t
·
AtNt − (1 − α) CtΦ
η
t − κη
µ
U∗
c∗,t
Uc,t
¶η
Φ
η
tα∗C∗
t −
θ
2
(πH,t − 1)
2
¸
}} − Ω e B0
A series of observations on the nature of this policy problem are in order. Notice, ﬁrst,
that the distinctive feature of the commitment problem under Nash competition is that the Home
15policymaker does not internalize that the relative price Φt = h(Ct,C∗
t ) depends also on the level of
consumption in Foreign. It is key to our analysis that the relative price Φt enters pervasively in
the behavioral relationships characterizing the optimal policy problem.
Second, it is of independent interest to notice that the present value budget constraint must
be part of the policy maximization problem. In fact, and unlike the closed economy case, it is
not implicitly satisﬁed by a combination of the government budget constraint and of the resource
feasibility constraint. This dimension characterizes speciﬁcally the policy maximization problem in
an open economy as opposed to the corresponding closed-economy case.
Third, in the following we assume that, prior to policy implementation, the initial wealth is
inelastically supplied (in fact, e B0 = 0 is given) and that policy is chosen taking the initial risk-
sharing arrangement as given.15 This has the crucial implication that, already in the Nash problem,
each policymaker is in fact facing the same present value budget constraint.
Finally, it is important to notice that, as a consequence of the initial stock of wealth e B0
being exogenously supplied, the multiplier Ω is taken as given in each policymaker’s maximization
problem. In other words, the initial stock of wealth does not depend on the anticipation about the
future implementation of policy.16
5.1.1 Non-recursivity and Initial Conditions
As a result of the constraint (45) exhibiting future expectations of control variables, the maximiza-
tion problem as spelled out in (47) is intrinsically non-recursive.17 As ﬁrst emphasized in Kydland
and Prescott (1980), and then developed by Marcet and Marimon (1999), a formal way to rewrite
the same problem in a recursive stationary form is to enlarge the planner’s state space with addi-
tional (pseudo) costate variables. Such variables, that we denote χt and χ∗
t for Home and Foreign
respectively, bear the crucial meaning of tracking, along the dynamics, the value to the planner
of committing to the pre-announced policy plan. Another aspect concerns the speciﬁcation of the
law of motion of these lagrange multipliers. For in our case the forward-looking Phillips curve
constraint features a simple one period expectation, the same costate variables have to obey the
laws of motion:18
15We believe this is a realistic assumption given that the two policymakers are acting under commitment.
16See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for a small open economy model in which the probability of future ”policy
reform” is not negligible and therefore the determination of e B0 is endogenous.
17See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978). As such the system does not satisfy per se the principle of
optimality, according to which the optimal decision at time t is a time invariant function only of a small set of state
variables.
18The laws of motion of the additional costate variables would take a more general form if the expectations horizon
in the forward looking constraint(s) featured a more complicated structure, as, for instance, in the case of constraints
in present value form. See Marcet and Marimon (1999).
16χt+1 = λp,t (48)
χ∗
t+1 = λ∗
p,t (49)
A particularly important point concerns the deﬁnition of the appropriate initial conditions for
χt and χ∗
t. Marcet and Marimon (1999) show that for the modiﬁed (recursive) Lagrangian in (47)
to generate a global optimum under time zero commitment it must hold:
χ0 =0=χ∗
0 (50)
The above condition states that there is no value to the policy planner, in either country and
as of time zero, attached to prior commitments. Commitment, in this context, bears exactly the
meaning that while it would be technically feasible for the planner (in each country) to satisfy (50)
for all t>0, it would also be suboptimal to do so.
In Appendix B we show how to reformulate the optimal plan in an equivalent recursive station-
ary form. First order conditions for time t ≥ 1f o rt h ec h o i c eo fCt, Nt and πH,t imply respectively:
0=Uc,t + Ucc,t πH,t(πH,t − 1) (λp,t − χt)+
λp,tNt
θ
( U n,tΦc,t +( ε − 1)AtUcc,t) (51)
−λf,t
h
(1 − α)
³
Φ
η
t + ηCtΦ
η−1
t Φc,t
´
− α∗C∗
t κηU∗η
c,t
³
ηΦ
η−1
t Φc,tU
−η
c,t − ηU
−η−1
c,t Ucc,tΦ
η
t
´i
−Ω
·
(AtNt −
θ
2
(πH,t − 1)2)
¡
Ucc,tΦ−1
t − Φc,tΦ−2
t Uc,t
¢
− (Ucc,tCt + Uc,t)
¸
0=Un,t +
λp,tεΦt
θ
(Un,t + NtUnn,t)+λp,t
ε − 1
θ
Uc,tAt + λf,tAt − Ω
Uc,tAt
Φt
(52)
0=Uc,t(2πH,t − 1)(λp,t − χt) − θ(πH,t − 1)
µ
λf,t − Ω
Uc,tAt
Φt
¶
(53)
The system of eﬃciency conditions for Home is completed by the law of motion (48), the initial
condition (50) and by the constraints (45) and (21) holding with equality. Notice also that ﬁrst
order conditions evaluated at time t =0d i ﬀer for what concerns equation (51), which must feature
the additional term −ΩB0
P0 Ucc,0.19
Once deﬁned a completely symmetric problem for the policy maker in Foreign, we can state
the following deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 3 (Nash equilibrium under commitment) The set of processes Λn
t ≡ {λp,t,λ f,t}∞
t=0,
Λn∗
t ≡ {λ∗
p,t,λ ∗
f,t}∞
t=0, Ξn
t ≡ {Ct,π H,t,N t}∞
t=0, Ξn∗
t ≡ {C∗
t ,π ∗
F,t,N ∗
t }∞
t=0 and the multiplier Ω fully
19Which, in particular, disappears under the particular assumption of B0 =0 .
17describe a Nash equilibrium under commitment if they solve the system of equations (51) - (53),
equations (45), (21), (26) holding with equality, along with a similar set of conditions jointly holding
for Foreign.
5.1.2 Nash-Optimal Inﬂa t i o nR a t ei nt h eL o n g - R u n
To determine the long-run optimal inﬂation rate associated to the Nash-game described above, one
needs to solve the steady state version of the set of eﬃciency conditions (51)-(53). In the language
of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model this amounts to computing the modiﬁed golden rule steady
state, or, in other words, the unconstrained long-run optimal inﬂation rate. This contrasts with
the golden rule inﬂation rate, which would correspond to the one that maximizes households’
instantaneous utility under the constraint that the steady state conditions are imposed ex-ante.
It is well known that in dynamic economies with discounted utility the two concepts of long-run
optimal policy cannot coincide.
In Appendix C we characterize the system of equations that describes the long-run steady state
associated to the optimal policy problem under Nash competition. Under the assumption α = α∗,
and of zero initial wealth (B0 = 0), the solution to the steady-state of the Nash game is symmetric
and features πH = π∗
F =1 ,Φ = Φ∗ =1 ,N = N∗,a n dC = C∗, along with a non-zero value
for the multiplier Ω. Hence the steady state of the solution to the Nash-optimal policy indicates
that, if unconstrained, both policymakers would choose to set the economy along a path that would
lead to a long-run net inﬂation rate of zero. The intuition for this result is simple. One can view
the modiﬁed golden rule as the long-run state of the economy when the discount rate β converges
to 1. In this case the steady state version of the Phillips curve relation (45) is vertical, and the
policymaker of either country cannot exert any eﬀect on markups by setting inﬂation rates diﬀerent
from zero.
5.1.3 Optimal Stabilization Policy around the Long-Run Steady-State
We are now in the position to analyze the dynamic features of the optimal commitment policy under
Nash competition. In this section we interpret optimal policy in the sense of optimal stabilization
in response to shocks. To this end, we proceed in the following way. After characterizing (for both
countries) the stationary allocations associated to the deterministic steady state of the ﬁrst order
conditions (51)-(53) (and symmetric ones for Foreign), we compute a log-linear approximation of
the respective policy functions in the neighborhood of the same long-run steady state.20
20From a methodological point view, it may be of independenti n t e r e s tt h a ta tt h i ss t a g e ,since the Nash-optimal
allocation has been already characterized, we can limit ourselves to employ standard log-linear approximation methods
to describe the policy function. On the other hand, when later computing relative conditional welfare of alternative
policy equilibria, we will have to resort to a second order approximation of the same policy function. This is necessary
to account for the natural eﬀect of stochastic volatility on the ﬁrst moments of critical variables, as well as for the
18The spirit of this exercise deserves some further comments. In concentrating on (log-linear)
dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady state associated to the eﬃciency conditions of the
Nash-optimal policy, we deviate from the initial requirement (50) in the fact that we set the
initial value of the lagged lagrange multipliers equal to their deterministic steady state values, i.e.,
χ0 = χ0 ; χ∗
0 = χ∗
0. It is important to understand that this strategy, as in Khan, King and
Wolman (2003), corresponds to focusing on a particular dimension. Namely, optimal stabilization
policy in response to bounded shocks that hit in the neighborhood of the long-run steady state.
This amounts to implicitly assuming that such a steady state has been already reached after the
implementation of the optimal policy plan as of time zero.21
5.1.4 Parameterization
In conducting our simulations we employ the following form of the period utility: U(Ct,N t)=
1
1−σC1−σ
t − 1
1+γN
1+γ
t . The time unit is meant to be quarters. The discount factor β is equal to
0.9 9 .T h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o nσ is 1, the inverse elasticity of labor supply γ is equal to 3. As
ab e n c h m a r kv a l u e( s e eb e l o wf o rad i s c u s s i o n )w es e tη = 2. As in Bergin and Tchakarov (2003),
and consistent with estimates by Ireland (2001), we set the price stickiness parameter θ equal to 50.
The elasticity ε between varieties produced by the monopolistic sector is 6. The (inverse) degree of
home bias α,i d e n t i ﬁed by the share of foreign imported goods in the domestic consumption basket,
is set to a default value of 0.4. This implies the existence of a mild home bias, which is assumed to
be symmetric across countries (α = α∗).
5.1.5 Response to Productivity Shocks: Nash-Optimal vs. Inﬂation Targeting
Figure 1 compares impulse responses of selected variables to a one percent rise in Home productivity
in the case of Nash-commitment with the same responses under (domestic) inﬂation targeting.T h e
ﬁgure is illustrative of the ineﬃciency associated to policy competition in our context. Since
productivity is higher in Home, the adjustment to the equilibrium requires an increase in the
demand of domestic relative to foreign goods. This is achieved by means of a terms of trade
depreciation, captured by a rise in the CPI to PPI ratio Φ. Recall, in fact, that Φt = Φ(Tt), i.e.,
the same ratio is a (positive) function of the terms of trade. The only equilibrium is the one in
which the same terms of trade depreciation is achieved via an increase in prices in both countries,
Home and Foreign. In fact, and due to risk sharing, both countries face the incentive to increase
prices to tilt the terms of trade in their own favor, thereby achieving a relatively higher real income
transitional dynamics that characterize the economy in its adjustment towards the long-run steady-state associated
to the optimal policy.
21To rephrase it, this corresponds to assuming that the economy has been evolving around such a steady state for
as u ﬃciently long period of time.
19and consumption for any given level of labor eﬀort. However, since Home is the country in which
productivity is relatively higher, the increase in domestic (producer) prices falls short the increase
in foreign (producer) prices. This explains why, for a given nominal adjustment in the exchange
rate, the terms of trade depreciate more in a Nash equilibrium relatively to the inﬂation targeting
case. In the resulting dynamics, since aggregate consumption must rise equally in both countries
due to risk sharing, the rise in employment exceeds the one that obtains under inﬂation targeting.
It is also interesting to notice that a Nash equilibrium generates a dynamic behavior of the price
level that resembles the one in response to a cost-push shock. The novel aspect of our results is that
the same dynamics are obtained in response to a productivity shock, which is not aimed per se (like
in many recent New Keynesian studies of optimal monetary policy) to induce the artiﬁcial eﬀect
of exogenously drifting the economy away from the eﬃc i e n ta l l o c a t i o n .T h ef a c tt h a tp r o d u c t i v i t y
shocks are a source of price variability under the optimal policy is here an endogenous outcome of
the competition on international relative prices.22
Figure 2 illustrates how the incentive to generate price movements vary with a critical param-
eter, namely the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The ﬁgure displays
impulse responses (under Nash-commitment) of the same selected variables to a productivity shock
for alternative values of η =[ 1 , 2, 3]. The ﬁrst case nearly corresponds to the benchmark case
of Cobb-Douglas preferences typically employed in the linear-quadratic approach to the study of
optimal policy for open economies. The literature lacks a consensus on the value of this parameter.
Harrigan (1993) and Treﬂer and Lai (1999) suggest an empirical value as high as 5. Collard and
Dellas (2002) derive an estimated value of 2.5. In their quantitative (theoretical) studies, Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1992) explore a range of η between 0 and 5. Chari et al (2002) set η =1 .5,
while Bergin and Tchakarov (2003) set η = 5. Overall, there seems to exist both empirical and
theoretical support for the hypothesis that the value of η lies above unity. The ﬁgure highlights
the coincidence of the Nash-optimal response with a close-to-price stability strategy only in the
particular case of η = 1. In this knife-edge case, the income eﬀect of the required terms of trade
depreciation (given the relatively higher productivity in Home) balances the incentive to switch
expenditure towards Home goods.23 In general, the higher the elasticity of substitution, the larger
(at the margin) the incentive for the policymaker to induce a strategic rise in the (producer) price
level to try to generate a relative appreciation of its own residents’ real income and purchasing
power for any given level of labor eﬀort.
22For an analysis of the optimal policy setting in response to this type of shocks see Woodford (2003) and Clarida
et al. (1999). For open economy models with one-period predetermined prices see Sutherland (2001).
23See also Benigno and Benigno (2003b). Another way of seeing this is that, from equations (39) and (40), both
Φt and Φ
∗
t cease to play any role in the determination of the equilibrium in the particular case of η =1 .
205.2 Cooperation
Under cooperation, a social planner explicitly recognizes the channel of interdependence that works
through the relative prices Φt and Φ∗
t.B e l o ww ed e ﬁne the world Ramsey planner problem, under
the assumption that the same planner aims at maximizing the average level of utility of the two
countries. We also assume that both countries receive equal weight in the planner’s objective
function.
Let’s deﬁne the world Ramsey period utility objective as:
Uw
t (Ct,C∗
t ,N t,N∗
t ,πH,t,π∗
F,t,Ωw) ≡
½
U(Ct,N t)+U∗
t (C∗
t ,N∗
t )
2
¾
+
Ωw
"
Uc,t
Ã
Ct −
AtNt − θ
2(πH,t − 1)2
Φt
!
+ U∗
c∗,t
Ã
C∗
t −
A∗
tN∗
t − θ
2(π∗
F,t − 1)2
Φ∗
t
!#
where Ωw is a constant multiplier on the sum of the constraints (26) and (29). Then the Ramsey
maximization problem can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. Let
©
λp,t,λ f,t,λ ∗
p,t,λ ∗
f,t
ª∞
t=0 represent sequences of Lagrange multipliers on
the constraints (45), (46), (21) and (22) respectively. Let e B0 be given and κ =1 . For any given
stochastic processes {At,A ∗
t}∞
t=0,p l a n sf o rt h ec o n t r o lv a r i a b l e s{Ct,π H,t,N t,C ∗
t ,π ∗
F,t,N ∗
t },a n d
for the costate variables {λp,t,λ f,t,λ ∗
p,t,λ ∗
f,t}∞
t=0 and Ωw, represent a ﬁrst best constrained allocation
if they solve the following maximization problem:
Choose Λc
t ≡
©
λp,t,λ f,t,λ ∗
p,t,λ ∗
f,t
ª∞
t=0 and Ξc
t ≡ {Ct,π H,t,N t}∞
t=0 to
Min{Λc
t}∞
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t}∞
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We defer to Appendix D the description of the ﬁrst order conditions corresponding to this plan.
The discussion on the non-recursivity structure of the problem follows exactly the logic applied
above to the re-deﬁnition of the Nash-commitment policy setup. In practice, this will entail speci-
fying an equivalent recursive stationary program in the new world planner’s state space deﬁned by
{At,A ∗
t,χ t,χ ∗
t}.
215.2.1 Ramsey Steady-State
A deterministic Ramsey steady state is a set of allocations {C,C∗,N,N∗,πH,π∗
F,Ωw} that solves
the steady-state version of the eﬃciency conditions associated to the program under Deﬁnition 3.
In Appendix E we characterize such system of equations. Under the assumption of zero initial net
wealth (B0 = 0), this steady state has a symmetric solution in which πH = π∗
F = 1. Hence, and
exactly like in the steady state version of the eﬃciency conditions of the Nash problem analyzed
above, the unconstrained long run optimal inﬂation policy is associated with price stability in both
countries.
5.2.2 Optimal Response to Shocks around the Ramsey Steady-State: Nash vs. Co-
operation
Figure 3 displays impulse responses to a normalized one percent increase in home productivity and
compare selected variables under Nash-commitment versus Cooperation-commitment. Under policy
cooperation, the planner coordinate the responses of both policy makers to achieve the required
terms of trade depreciation only by means of a nominal exchange rate depreciation. In other words,
it is optimal for the Ramsey planner to have both countries targeting very closely the ﬂexible price
allocation. This results in a dampened dynamic of the CPI-PPI ratio Φ under cooperation. The
crucial aspect is that this is now compatible with a smooth path of the price level (the response
of the price level, measured in percent deviation from steady state, barely deviates from zero) and
with a smoother response of employment, for any given variation in consumption (in turn equalized
across countries).
It is also interesting to notice, under the Ramsey cooperative regime, that while the response
of the price level resembles the one that would obtain in a closed economy under the optimal
policy (see for instance King and Wolman, 1997), so does not the response of employment. For an
intuition, consider the (equilibrium) real marginal cost equation (44). As already emphasized, the
closed economy version of that equation obtains in the case Φt = 1. Hence, in a closed economy, it
is optimal, in response to a rise in productivity, to fully absorb the rise in productivity by means
of an equal increase in consumption (and output), while keeping employment constant. In an open
economy, the equilibrium requires a rise in Φt ( i.e., a real depreciation). Hence, coordinating on
stable prices (i.e., constant real marginal costs), requires a rise in consumption which is smaller than
the one in productivity and, under the benchmark parameterization, also a rise in employment.24
24The size of the rise in employment will be, in turn, a function of the elasticity η (with a smaller η implying a
smaller rise) and of the labor supply elasiticity
1
γ (with a higher elasticity requirying a smaller rise in employment).
226 Welfare Analysis and Dynamic Features of the Ramsey Policy
We now turn to a characterization of the dynamic properties of the alternative policy regimes
analyzed so far.25 We illustrate our numerical analysis in terms of cyclical properties of selected
variables and welfare levels associated to each policy arrangements. We report results under three
alternative parameter scenarios: 1) High home bias, in which the value of α = α∗ is set to 0.1; 2)
Small home bias in which α = α∗ =0 .45; 3) Low elasticity of substitution, in which η =0 .1.
Some observations on the computation of welfare are in order. First, one cannot safely rely on
standard ﬁrst order approximation methods to compare the relative welfare implied by each policy
arrangement. In fact, in an economy like ours, in which distortions exert an eﬀect both in the short
and in the long-run, stochastic volatility aﬀects both ﬁrst and second moments of those variables
that are critical for household’s welfare. Since in a ﬁrst order approximation of the model’s solution
the expected value of a variable is always equal to its non-stochastic steady state, the eﬀects of
volatility on mean values of variables is by construction neglected. Hence policy arrangements can
be correctly ranked only by means of a higher order approximation of the policy functions.26
This last observation suggests also that our welfare metric needs to be correctly chosen. In
particular one needs to focus on the conditional expected discounted utility of the representative
agent. This is necessary exactly to take into account of transitional eﬀects from the deterministic to
the diﬀerent stochastic steady states respectively uimplied by each alternative policy arrangement.
We proceed in the following steps. First, we compute a second order approximation of the
policy function(s) around the long-run deterministic steady-state implied by each policy regime
under scrutiny.27 Then we assume that both economies are subject to a stationary distribution of
25More in line with the present analysis is the one of Kollmann (2003) and Bergin and Tchakarov (2003), who
study optimizing linear interest rate rules and perform welfare calculations based on a second order approximation of
the model’s equilibrium conditions. Our paper diﬀers crucially in that it characterizes equilibrium allocations under
the Ramsey policy, without restricting the form of the policy function to the arguments of a pre-speciﬁed (log-linear)
interest rate rule.
26See Kim and Kim (2002) for an analysis of the inaccuracy of welfare calculations based on log-linear approxi-
mations in dynamic open economies. See Kim et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for a more general
discussion.
27The set of optimality conditions of the Ramsey plan can be described as follows:
Et f(Yt+1,Y t,X t+1,X t)=0 ( 5 5 )
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator, conditional on information available at time t, Yt is the
vector of endogenous non-predetermined variables and Xt ≡ [x1,t,x 2,t] is the state vector. Here x1,t denotes the
vector of (pseudo) co-state variables [χt,χ
∗
t], while x2,t is the vector of exogenous variables [At,A
∗
t]w h i c hf o l l o w sa
stochastic process.
x2,t+1 = zx2,t + ησεt+1; εt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,Σ)( 5 6 )
The scalar σ and η are known parameters. The solution to the model is of the form:
Yt = g(Xt,σ)( 5 7 )
23(productivity shocks) and generate, for given initial conditions, artiﬁcial time series of length Tp =
500 periods. We compute mean, standard deviation and implied presented discounted utility for
any given random draw. We then iterate the computation Tn = 1000 times and average across
experiments.28
Along the lines of Lucas (1987), the measure of welfare cost (of business cycles) that we
associate to each policy is the proportional upward shift in the consumption process that would
be required to make the representative household indiﬀerent between its random consumption
allocation and a nonrandom consumption allocation with the same mean. Hence such measure is
deﬁned as the fraction ∆ that satisﬁes the following equality between conditional utilities:
E0
∞ X
t=0
βtU((1 + ∆)Ct,N t)=
∞ X
t=0
βtU(E0 (Ct,N t)) (59)
In Table 1 we report second moments of selected variables under Nash competition and Co-
operation. In particular, we report the cyclical properties of the CPI to PPI ratio (our key relative
price) meant as a proxy of the terms trade. Hence we see that, across parameter scenarios, and
relative to cooperation, Nash competition is indeed a source of enhancement of inﬂation volatility.
In particular this happens in a low home bias scenario. Intuitively, under this scenario, economies
are more open to trade, and therefore, at the margin, more open to a policy competition motive
over their terms of trade. However, deviations from price stability, once measured in terms of sec-
ond moments of inﬂation, remain per se rather small under Nash competition and barely diﬀerent
from the regime of Cooperation.
In the same Table we also report the measure ∆ of the welfare costs associated to the alter-
native policy scenarios. Hence it is clear that cooperation delivers welfare gains relative to a Nash
competition arrangement. However, such welfare numbers remain quite small. In absolute terms,
and across all policy scenarios, the upward shift in consumption needed to make the household indif-
ferent between a random and a nonrandom allocation range between a minimum of 0.0113 percent
(achieved under Cooperation with high home bias) to a maximum of 0.0157 percent (achieved
under Nash competition with low home bias). In relative terms, welfare gains from Cooperation
are also rather small. This result, however, is hardly surprising. That both policies were delivering
Xt+1 = h(Xt,σ)+
−
ησεt+1 (58)
where Yt is the vector of control variables, equation (57) is the policy function and equation (58) is the transition
function. We compute a second order expansion of the functions g(xt,σ)a n dh(xt,σ). Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2002) show, crucially, that, up to a second order, the coeﬃcients of the policy functions attached to terms that are
linear in the state vector xt are independent of the size of the volatility of the shock(s). To evaluate numerically the
ﬁrst and second order derivatives of the policy functions we employ the Matlab codes compiled by Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe, available at the website http://www.econ.duke.edu/˜grohe/.
28We employ a standard parameterization for the innovations to the productivity processes, and assume Va r(ε
a
t)=
Va r(ε
a∗
t )=( 0 .01)
2, with persistence ρ
a = ρ
a∗
=0 .9.
24very similar dynamics in response to the same distribution of shocks was already apparent from
our previous impulse response analysis.
It is of some interest, however, to see that, in our exercise, such gains may depend on the com-
parative statics on two critical parameters that identify ”openness” and that aﬀect the relationship
between the terms of trade and the CPI to PPI ratio, namely α and η . Hence our exercise indi-
cate that welfare gains from cooperation are minimized when the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods η is small, and maximized when the home bias is low (i.e., α =0 .45).
Intuitively, these two scenarios correspond, respectively, to a case in which the policy competition
motive is either reduced in scope or, alternatively, magniﬁed.
7G o l d e n R u l e
So far we have concentrated only on the optimal short-run stabilization policy around a deter-
ministic Ramsey steady-state. This is the steady state associated to the eﬃciency conditions that
describe the optimal policy under commitment (modiﬁed golden rule). In this long-run, the policy-
maker faces no incentive to use the inﬂation instrument to aﬀect the markup via an exploitation of
the Phillips curve. However, if the policymaker was forced to maximize households’ utility under
the constraint that the steady state conditions are imposed ex-ante, this may lead to the presence
of an inﬂationary or deﬂationary bias. In analogy with the terminology of the neoclassical growth
model, and as in King and Wolman (1997), we can deﬁne this as the policy maker’s golden rule.
To understand whether openness coupled with policy competition is responsible for either an
inﬂationary or deﬂationary bias, let us focus on how the relevant distortions interact in a golden rule
steady state. It is ﬁrst instructive to derive the markup function from the competitive equilibrium
of the domestic open economy. By combining the steady-state version of (5) and (12) we can write
−Un
Uc
=
1
µ
PH
P
=
1
µ(πH,N)
[Φ(T )]
−1
where the function µ(πH,N) derives from the steady-state version of (18) as
µ(πH,N)=
εN
θπH(πH − 1)(1 − β)+( ε − 1)N
(60)
Hence eﬃciency in any given steady state of the economy requires
µ(πH,N)Φ(T ) = 1 (61)
To gain intuition on how the international relative price distortion (summarized by the wedge
Φ(T ) which is increasing in T ) interacts with the markup distortion from the view point of a given
country, let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that producer prices are fully ﬂexible, so that the
25markup is always equal to a constant value of ε
ε−1. We therefore temporarily abstract from the
price-stickiness distortion. By making use of (36), we can rewrite a relationship between the desired
terms of trade and the markup which reads
T =
µ
α
µη−1 − (1 − α)
¶ 1
η−1
(62)
Notice that, independently of the values of η and α, T is always decreasing in µ.O n es h o u l d
view equation (62) as an iso-eﬃciency condition. Hence, and in order to keep the economy at the
maximum welfare in steady-state, a higher markup calls for more appreciated terms of trade. The
intuition is simple. The presence of imperfectly competitive output markets makes desirable to
expand output towards the eﬃcient level. While in an closed economy with ﬂexible prices this is
always welfare improving, in an open economy the same rise in output requires (in equilibrium)
also a depreciation of the terms of trade, which hurts the purchasing power of domestic consumers.
Equation (62) shows that, at the margin and for any given level of foreign consumption,i ti so p t i m a l
to have the terms of trade depreciate less, or equivalently let output expand less relatively to the
case of an imperfectly competitive closed economy.
However, such a strategic incentive characterizes also the optimal reaction function in Foreign.
To formalize the policy game let’s deﬁne, for any given C∗ ,t h egolden rule Nash steady state for
Home as the triplet
{πH,C,N}gr ≡ argmax{U(C,N)} (63)
subject to a (steady state) pricing-implementability condition
πH(πH − 1)(1 − β) ≤
εN
θ
µ
−UnΦ(C,C∗)
Uc
−
ε − 1
ε
¶
(64)
and to a (steady state) feasibility constraint
N ≤ (1 − α) C [Φ(C,C∗)]
η +
µ
κU∗
c∗
Uc
¶η
[Φ(C,C∗)]
η α∗C∗ +
θ
2
(πH − 1)
2 (65)
where it is understood that C∗is taken as given from the view point of the policymaker in Home but
is instead chosen optimally by the policymaker in Foreign. First order conditions of this problem
deﬁne Home policymaker’s reaction function for any given level of Foreign consumption. An exactly
symmetric problem characterizes the reaction function of the policymaker in Foreign.
The solution to the joint system of equations pins down the Nash equilibrium, and is reported
in Figure 4. The dashed line shows the solution of the Nash game for a selected number of variables
as a function of the (inverse) home bias parameter α. This parameter is a natural index of openness
in our context. In the simulations, we set the vector [σ, γ, η]=[ 1, 3, 2], while we maintain that
26α = α∗.H e n c ew es e et h a tf o rα → 0 the rate of (producer) inﬂation that maximizes steady-state
welfare is positive and coincides exactly with the one of the corresponding closed economy with
sticky prices and monopolistic competition. As α turns positive, i.e., both economies become open
to trade, the desired steady-state inﬂation rate decreases below the one of the corresponding closed
economy. The intuition is simple. As explained above, policy competition calls for a strategic
reduction in consumption (relative to the closed economy case) in order to obtain an appreciation
of the terms of trade and a reduction in work eﬀort. For any given level of foreign consumption,
and in the absence of any asymmetric shock, this is welfare improving. However, in a Nash-game
where policy objectives collide, terms of trade and work eﬀort remain constant, while consumption
ends up being slightly lower. This entails, for any level of openness (as measured by α), a lower
steady-state rate of inﬂation relative to a closed economy.
On the other hand, if two policymakers coordinate their actions in order to avoid a strategic
manipulation of the terms of trade, they can enjoy higher consumption for any given level of work
eﬀort. Under Cooperation, we assume that the planner chooses simultaneously the two triplets
{πH,C ,N } and {π∗
F,C ∗,N ∗} in order to maximize average utility
U(C,N)+U(C∗,N∗)
2 , subject to
the constraints (64), (65) and to the corresponding equations for Foreign.
Figure 5 (in solid line) shows the outcome of the optimal cooperative policy game. Notice
that once again the optimal inﬂation rate lies below the one of the corresponding closed economy.
Yet the inﬂation rate under policy cooperation lies above the one prevailing under Nash competi-
tion. Intuitively, under cooperation, the planner induces both policymakers to avoid any strategic
reduction in consumption aimed at appreciating the terms of trade. In equilibrium, the terms of
trade and work eﬀort are unchanged, and consumption is higher relative to the Nash outcome.
This, ceteris paribus, entails also a relatively higher inﬂation rate.
Is the result of a Nash deﬂationary bias (relative to Cooperation) robust to parameter values?
In fact it is not. Intuitively, and as emphasized, although in a diﬀerent framework, also by Suther-
land (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2003b), the gains from strategically manipulating the terms
of trade should be decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,
for this is a measure of the strength of the expenditure switching eﬀect. We therefore employ an
alternative parameterization, with high labor supply elasticity and low international elasticity of
substitution. This implies setting [σ, γ, η]=[ 1 , 1, 0.7]. We see that in this case there exist values
for the degree of openness such that the inﬂation rate under Nash lies above the one under policy
cooperation. It is only when the economy becomes extremely open (i.e., the degree of home bias is
extremely small) that the Nash deﬂationary bias result re-emerges.
The above discussion on the golden-rule incentives for an optimal inﬂation policy can be
summarized as follows:
Result 1 (Open economy bias). In an open economy with price adjustment costs and monopo-
27listic competition, the (producer) inﬂation rate that maximizes steady-state utility lies monotonically
below the one of the corresponding closed economy. This holds under both policy competition and
cooperation.
The interesting aspect of Result 1 is that, while in a closed economy with sticky prices and
monopolistic competition price stability cannot implement the steady-state maximization of welfare,
it can indeed do so when the economy is open, due to the additional eﬀect of the international
relative price distortion that pushes the eﬃcient inﬂation rate downwards.
Result 2 (Nash bias ). There is no monotonic ranking between the golden rule inﬂation
rate under Nash and the one under Cooperation. Hence policy competition may lead either to a
deﬂationary or inﬂationary bias depending on the degree of trade openness and on the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
This result diﬀers from the one of Cooley and Quadrini (2003), who ﬁnd that policy competition
is necessarily associated with an inﬂationary bias. The reason lies in the structure of their model,
which features ﬂexible prices and an unambiguos positive output eﬀect of real appreciations. In our
context, and crucially, prices are sticky (so that monetary authorities can exert a direct eﬀect on the
terms of trade) and the eﬀect of international relative price movements on output strictly depends
on the value of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. In particular,
under our preferred parameterization of η>1 (with log utility), real appreciations exert a negative
eﬀect on output.
8 Conclusions
We have laid out a typical public ﬁnance framework for the analysis of welfare maximizing mon-
etary policy within an economy characterized by three distortions: market power, rigidity in the
adjustment of producer prices and international terms of trade externality. The main advantage of
our approach, relative to the existing literature, is that it allows to characterize optimal policy in
a fully dynamic open economy setting while maintaining all the distortions completely spelled out
both in the short and in the long run.
Despite the generality of the approach, our modelling framework remains restrictive in three
main dimensions. First, in assuming that the law of one price for traded goods holds continually.
Second, in allowing households to obtain full risk sharing via international ﬁnancial markets. Third,
in not allowing households to invest in physical capital. Amending on all these features should aim
at generating less trivial dynamics of the current account than the ones generated here via the
only movements in the trade balance. Such dynamics may be of ﬁrst order importance for the
welfare evaluation along two dimensions. First, they would more critically aﬀect the transition
from deterministic to stochastic steady state. Second, they would impinge on the transition from
one policy regime to another. For instance from Nash-competition to cooperation, or from the
28optimal commitment policy to a ﬁxed exchange rate arrangement. Given the ﬂexibility and the
rigor of a Ramsey-based approach, all these issues will certainly be the source of new research
eﬀorts in international macroeconomics in the near future.
29A Proof of Proposition 1
(Part A). The proof follows from the substitutions and the rearrangements of Section 4 that lead
to the minimal form. (Part B). For given productivity processes At,A ∗
t and using the allocations
{Ct,C∗
t ,N t,N∗
t ,Φt, Φ∗
t}
∞
t=0 satisfying the optimal plan, one can obtain the optimal allocation for
the real wage, output and real marginal cost from (5), the aggregate version of (11) and (12), which
are symmetric across countries. Using the producer inﬂation rates
n
πH,t,π ∗
F,t
o
obtained by the
optimal plan and the relative prices {Φt, Φ∗
t}
∞
t=0 one can obtain the CPI inﬂation rates from (41)
and the analog for Foreign. For given optimal paths {Ct,C∗
t }
∞
t=0 the path for the real exchange
rate follows from (28). Given {Φt, Φ∗
t}
∞
t=0,t h i sa l l o w st os o l v ef o rt h et e r m so ft r a d ef r o m( 3 7 ) .B y
rewriting CH =( 1− α)Φ
η
tCt and CF,t = α(ΦtTt)
η Ct from (2) one obtains consumption demand
for domestic and foreign goods. For given consumption, the path for the real interest rate is given
by (42), which implies, given CPI inﬂation, a path for the nominal rate via equation (43).
B The Stationary Dynamic Policy Problem
Below we derive the stationary form of the policy problem under Nash commitment. We illustrate
the argument only for the Home policymaker’s problem, since the problem in Foreign is exactly
symmetric. Let’s consider the optimal plan as formulated in equation (47) in the text. By applying
the law of iterated expectations and by grouping expectations and multipliers that share the same
date one obtains:
Min{Λt}∞
t=0 Max{Ξt}∞
t=0E0{U(C0,N 0,π H,0, Ω)
+λp,0
·
Uc,0πH,0(πH,0 − 1) +
Uc,0εA0N0
θ
µ
Un,0Φ0
Uc,0A0
+
ε − 1
ε
¶¸
+λf,0
·
A0N0 − (1 − α)C0Φ
η
0 − κη
µ
U∗
c∗,0
Uc,0
¶η
Φ
η
0α∗C∗
0 −
θ
2
(πH,0 − 1)
2
¸
+β{U(C1,N 1)+( λp,1 − βλp,0)(Uc,1πH,1(πH,1 − 1)) + λp,1
µ
Uc,1εA1N1
θ
µ
Un,1Φ1
Uc,1A1
+
ε − 1
ε
¶¶
+λf,1
·
A1N1 − (1 − α)C1Φ
η
1 − κη
µ
U∗
c∗,1
Uc,1
¶η
Φ
η
1α∗C∗
1 −
θ
2
(πH,1 − 1)
2
¸
+ ...}} − Ω e B0
Notice that this problem is not time-invariant due to the fact that the constraints at time zero
lack the term −βλp,−1(Uc,0πH,0(πH,0−1)). For this reason we amplify the state space to introduce
a new (pseudo) costate variable χt and deﬁne a new policy functional W(Ct,N t,πH,t,χ t,Ω) ≡
U(Ct,N t,πH,t,Ω) − χt(Uc,tπH,t(πH,t − 1)). We then write the optimal policy plan in the following
form:
30Choose Λt ≡ {λp,t,λ f,t}∞
t=0 and Ξt ≡ {Ct,π H,t,N t}∞
t=0 to
Min{Λt}∞
t=0 Max{Ξt}∞
t=0 E0{
∞ X
t=0
βtEt{W(Ct,N t,πH,t,χ t,Ω) (66)
+λp,t
·
Uc,tπH,t(πH,t − 1) +
Uc,tεAtNt
θ
µ
Un,t Φt
Uc,tAt
+
ε − 1
ε
¶¸
+λf,t
·
AtNt − (1 − α) CtΦ
η
t − κη
µ
U∗
c∗,t
Uc,t
¶η
Φ
η
tα∗C∗
t −
θ
2
(πH,t − 1)
2
¸
}} − Ω e B0
with law of motion for the new costate
χt+1 = λp,t
and initial condition
χ0 =0
Following Marcet and Marimon (1999), one can show that this new maximization program is now
saddle point stationary in the ampliﬁed state space {At, χt}. First order conditions of this problem
exactly replicate conditions (51)-(53) in the text. An exactly symmetric argument is applied to
the design of the policy problem in Foreign, which will involve specifying an ampliﬁed state space
{A∗
t, χ∗
t}, with law of motion χ∗
t+1 = λ∗
p,t and initial condition χ∗
0 =0 .
C Steady State of the Nash-Optimal Policy Problem
The steady state version of the eﬃciency conditions (51)-(53) of the Nash problem is derived by
imposing λp,t = λp,t−1 = λp = χ.T h i si m p l i e s :
0=Uc +
λpN
θ
( U nΦc +( ε − 1)Ucc) − λf (1 − α)
¡
Φη + ηCΦη−1Φc
¢
+λf α∗C∗κηU∗η
c
¡
ηΦη−1ΦcU−η
c − ηU−η−1
c UccΦη¢
−Ω
·
(N −
θ
2
(πH − 1)2)
¡
UccΦ−1 − ΦcΦ−2Uc
¢
− (UccC + Uc)
¸
0=Un +
λpεΦ
θ
(Un + NUnn)+λp
ε − 1
θ
Uc + λf − Ω
Uc
Φ
0=−θ(πH − 1)
µ
λf − Ω
Uc
Φ
¶
The system is completed by the steady state version of (4), (45), (21) along with symmetric equation
for Foreign. One can easily verify that the solution is a vector
n
Ω,C ,C ∗,N ,N ∗,π H, π∗
F, λF, λ∗
F, λp, λ∗
p,
o
with πH, = π∗
F, =1 ,C = C∗,N= N∗, Φ = Φ∗ =1 .
31D First Order Conditions of the Policy Cooperation Problem
First order conditions for the Ramsey problem under Cooperation at time t ≥ 1r e a d :
0=
1
2
Uc,t + Ucc,t πH,t(πH,t − 1) (λp,t − χt)+
λp,tNtε
θ
Un,tΦc,t + λp,t
µ
ε − 1
θ
¶
AtNtUcc,t (67)
−λf,t (1 − α)
³
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η
t + ηCtΦ
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i
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µ
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θ
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θ
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θ
2
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¡
−Φ∗
c,tΦ∗−2
t
¢
Un,t +
λp,tεΦt
θ
(Un,t + NtUnn,t)+λp,t
µ
ε − 1
θ
¶
Uc,tAt + λf,tAt + ΩwUc,tAt
Φt
= 0 (68)
Uc,t(2πH,t − 1)(λp,t − χt) − θ(πH,t − 1)
µ
λf,t + ΩwUc,tAt
Φt
¶
= 0 (69)
The expression for Φ∗
c,t ≡
∂Φ∗
t
∂Ct reads:
Φ∗
c,t = −
µ
α∗
1 − α∗
¶
(Φ∗
t)
2−η ¡
U∗
c,t
¢η−1 κη−1
h
Φ
η−2
t Φc,tU
−(η−1)
c,t − U
−η
c,t Ucc,tΦ
η−1
t
i
The set of analogous conditions for Foreign variables at time t ≥ 0 will involve an expression for
Φc∗,t ≡ ∂Φt
∂C∗
t :
Φc∗,t = −
µ
α
1 − α
¶
Φ
2−η
t (Uc,t)
η−1 κ1−η
h
(Φ∗
t)
η−2 Φ∗
c∗,t
¡
U∗
c,t
¢−(η−1) −
¡
U∗
c,t
¢−η U∗
cc,t (Φ∗
t)
η−1
i
In addition all constraints must hold with equality. Also, when evaluated at time t = 0, condition
(67) must feature the additional term −Ωw
0
B0
P0 .
E Steady State of the Policy Cooperation Problem
Under Cooperation the steady state version of the eﬃciency conditions (67)-(69) reads:
320=
1
2
Uc +
λpNε
θ
UnΦc + λp
µ
ε − 1
θ
¶
NUcc
−λf (1 − α)
¡
Φη + ηCΦη−1Φc
¢
− λfα∗C∗κη (U∗
c∗)
η £
ηΦη−1ΦcU−η
c − ηU−η−1
c UccΦη¤
+λ∗
p
µ
εN∗U∗
nΦ∗
c
θ
¶
− λ∗
f
³
η (Φ∗)
η−1 Φ∗
c (1 − α∗)C∗
´
−λ∗
fακ−η (U∗
c∗)
−η
h
η(Φ∗)
η−1 Φ∗
cCUη
c +( Φ∗)
η ¡
Uη
c + ηUη−1
c UccC
¢i
+Ωw(N −
θ
2
(πH − 1)2)
¡
UccΦ−1 − ΦcΦ−2Uc
¢
− Ωw (UccC + Uc)+
+Ωw(N∗ −
θ
2
(π∗
F − 1)2) U∗
c∗
¡
−Φ∗
cΦ∗−2¢
0=Un +
λpεΦ
θ
(Un + NUnn)+λp
µ
ε − 1
θ
¶
Uc + λf + ΩwUc
Φ
0=−θ(πH − 1)
µ
λf + ΩwUc
Φ
¶
The system is completed by the steady state version of (4), (45), (21) along with symmetric
equation for Foreign. One can easily verify that the solution is again a vector
n
Ω,C ,C ∗,N ,N ∗,πH, π∗
F, λF, λ∗
F, λp
with πH = π∗
F =1 ,C = C∗,N= N∗, Φ = Φ∗ =1 .
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36              Table 1
                   Volatility and Welfare under Alternative Policy Regimes 
      High Home Bias      Low Home Bias             Low Elasticity
      Nash Cooperation      Nash Cooperation      Nash Cooperation
Consumption 1.553 1.443 1.834 1.695 1.561 1.491
Labor 0.227 0.196 0.184 0.100 0.155 0.142
PPI Inflation 0.053 0.005 0.072 0.006 0.041 0.009
CPI/PPI Ratio 0.698 0.699 0.240 0.237 1.552 1.541
Welfare cost ∆ 0.0122 0.0113 0.0157 0.0146 0.0118 0.0118
Note:  Standard deviations are in %. The welfare cost (in %) is the proportional upward shift in the consumption process that 
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